Abstract
Preface
During fifteen years in the flying profession, I have participated in countless briefings and academic sessions on how to survive an air-to-air threat and how to kill a fixed enemy target.
Comparatively little time has been spent in efforts to survive a surface-to-air threat or engage a low-contrast target. Yet surface threats historically account for the majority of Air Force casualties while every major US conflict of the twentieth century has required the engagement of battlefield targets in adverse environments.
This research paper does not attempt to address "why" the Air 
Abstract
The Air Force has employed well-trained personnel and superior technology over the past eleven years to effect decisive victories over credible, though somewhat unprepared enemy forces. The success of these operations has resulted in an increased self-confidence in US tactics and technology while it has raised societal expectations of low casualty operations. This success has also affected the daily regimen of combat air force (CAF) training programs. Despite recurring losses to surface-based threats and the continued need for all-weather close air support (CAS), CAF training overwhelmingly concentrates on surviving air-to-air threats and engaging fixed targets. CAF combat capability is reduced by the practice of training towards the most doctrinally effective use of airpower over the most recurring need for airpower. This research paper examines the recurring lessons of airpower history, analyzes current trends and threats, and then offers a training program to survive the most lethal threats and kill the most critical targets.
Since 1965, anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) and surface-to-air missiles (SAM) have claimed over 1500 Air Force aircraft while enemy MiGs have accounted for 66 USAF losses.
1 Despite this disparity in lethality, Air Force fighter training has overwhelmingly sought to master air-toair survival skills while downplaying the more lethal surface threat. This training imbalance was greatest in the late 1970's when CAF aviators rigorously trained in conjunction with dedicated air-to-air adversary squadrons but without the benefit of dedicated surface threat adversaries.
The training culminated in Operation DESERT STORM where the Air Force achieved a 31 to 0 air-to-air kill ratio while suffering 14 combat losses to surface threats 2 . The adversary training v which led to this air superiority success has now diminished to more closely reflect the limited training opportunities of the Vietnam-era.
Similarly, current CAF close air support (CAS) and air interdiction (AI) training resembles the regimen which normally dominates inter-war periods. Every major US conflict of the twentieth century has required the engagement of CAS/AI targets in adverse environments. Yet every inter-war period sees the erosion of adverse weather CAS/AI skills due to insufficient emphasis and training.
Modern trends indicate a continued need for the ability to survive surface threats and attack low-contrast targets. High opstempo/low experienced aviators face an increased proliferation of advanced SAMs. Aircrews are now required to operate in an era of casualty sensitivity and collateral damage minimization. CAF aviators also face a world of increased peace operations and urbanization. CAF training must adapt to these lessons and trends to align every sortie with the skills required for maximum survivability and lethality during expected wartime tasks. The
Air Force cannot allow the ineptitude of recent adversaries to instill an ill-deserved and illadvised US superiority complex and it cannot wait for a catastrophic military failure to provide the catalyst for innovation. 
Introduction -Adapt To Survive and Kill
Prejudice against innovation is a typical characteristic of an officer corps which has grown up in a well-tried and proven system.
-Field Marshall Erwin Rommel The Rommel Papers
The US military is definitely a "well-tried and proven system." It has employed well-trained personnel and superior technology over the past eleven years to effect decisive victories over credible, though somewhat unprepared enemy forces. The success of these operations has resulted in an increased self-confidence in US tactics and technology while it has raised societal expectations of low casualty military engagements. However, this success has provided some "fog and friction" now working against innovation and effective training. To ensure victory, the Air Force must study the recurring lessons of history, analyze current trends and threats, and then develop a congruent training program to survive the most lethal threats and kill the most critical targets. It must increasingly concentrate on the most recurring need for airpower instead of the most effective use of airpower.
Enemy engagement strategies focus on US strengths and weaknesses. Adversaries adapt to US information superiority and precision strike capability by dispersing into the streets and forests of the world. This reduces airpower's effectiveness and provides an adversary with the optimum setting to inflict American casualties. Potential enemies increasingly rely on surface-to-air defense systems due to US counterair capability. Surface threats have inflicted the greatest losses to US aircraft in every conflict of the twentieth century.
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Another result of US success is the expectation of minimal casualties. US combat capability has evolved to the extent that this is no longer an expectation, but rather a requirement. This "requirement" in turn threatens the historic measurement of combat capability.
Military combat capability, first and foremost, strives to survive the threat and kill the target.
To that end we need the ability to identify and train towards the most lethal threats and the most critical targets. From the dawn of recorded civilization, Sumerians, Assyrians, Greeks and Romans sought this same objective: to survive the threat and kill the enemy. Before "doctrine"
occupied daily thought and language, these militaries sought to "organize, equip and train" to survive and kill. Peripheral commitments and training that detract from these skills threaten baseline combat capability.
Surface-to-air defense systems are the most lethal threats to Air Force aircraft. Radarguided surface-to-air missiles (SAM), infrared tracking SAMs, and anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) exist worldwide in greater concentrations and longer ranges than do less prolific air threats. Weasels were older and more regularly engaged with surface threats when compared to Air Force F-15Es, Navy F/A-18s, USMC AV-8Bs and coalition Tornado GR-1s. Yet, the F-4Gs, arguably the only pre-war aircraft to regularly train to dedicated surface threats, suffered lower combat loss rates than all of these newer and more maneuverable aircraft. 17 The greatest air losses of Desert Storm came from low altitude tactics. 18 Despite numerous low altitude losses during the Korea and Vietnam Wars, in the absence of peacetime surface threat aggressors, Iraqi ground fire and shoulder launched SAMs served up a painful lethality lesson. 19 In the past ten years, the USAF has been continuously engaged in contingency operations over Iraq and conflicts in the Balkans. During this time, CAF training has followed the focus of the '80s with more emphasis on air-to-air survival in comparison to more prolific surface threats. 20 Numerous CAF weapons school graduates support the assertion that few, if any, Air
Force fighter squadrons fly building-block training missions exclusively against surface threats while routinely training exclusively against air threats.
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Individual surface-to-air threat defense skills are paramount for survival. During contingency operations, over 700 Air Force aircraft have been engaged by Iraqi AAA and SAM systems. 22 Over 700 SAMs were shot at coalition aircraft during Allied Force resulting in 2 USAF losses. 23 In most of these engagements, the time required for a suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) aircraft to place a High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM) on an enemy SAM normally exceeded the flyout time of the SAM. 24 Although equally critical in terms of required survival skills, the Air Force has experienced comparatively minimal opposition from any air threat since Desert Storm. 25 The lesson of Vietnam was the value of dedicated adversary threat training. Desert Storm confirmed the benefits of a rigorous DACT program and dedicated adversaries. Following the historic trends from Korea, Vietnam, and Desert Storm, US contingency operations and Balkan conflicts provide the recurring lesson that the greatest threat, and the greatest training need, still comes from the ground up.
Targets That Continue to Elude Us
Our basic job over here is to bomb targets, not chase MiGs.
-Brigadier General Robin Olds
Change of Command
As surface threat lethality is the greatest recurring lesson to aircraft survival, the need for all-weather CAS/interdiction skills is the most recurring offensive airpower lesson. Every major US conflict of the twentieth century has required the engagement of CAS/AI targets in adverse environments. In World War I, the Allied Meuse-Argonne offensive used CAS as a substitute for artillery until the weather halted flight operations. 26 In World War II, the 101 st Airborne
Division waited for clear weather and 9 th Air Force CAS aircraft to attack surrounding German units and enable a breakout. 27 A desperate ground situation, poor weather and political restrictions resulted in the majority of Korean War missions being dedicated to interdiction and CAS. 28 "So desperate was the plight of the ground forces that even the B-29s were committed almost exclusively to interdiction attacks." 29 "Interdiction, armed reconnaissance and close air support accounted of 67 percent of all Far East Air Force (FEAF) sorties flown." 30 The so-called "strategic" war in Korea lasted less than two months accounting for just 0.2 percent of FEAF combat sorties. 31 CAS and interdiction missions in Korea were of greater importance to the success of American efforts than in any previous conflict. However, many of the advances (from WWII) toward an effective C2 system were either stymied or even reversed. In the early days of the war, CAS was often the first priority for air assets. United Nations command (UNC) ground forces weaknesses in field artillery, especially heavy artillery, forced UNC air units to concentrate on CAS. CAS was to play a decisive role during the initial North Korean invasion and the subsequent Chinese intervention. 32 Political restrictions during the Vietnam War effectively diverted the majority of fighter missions towards interdiction and CAS. 33 Nearly 75 percent of all sorties were flown in support of ground forces and much of this took place in an environment fraught with adverse weather and terrain. 34 At the time of this report, unfavorable weather precludes the delivery with any consistent accuracy, of ordnance by any aircraft/weapon systems employed in SEA [Southeast Asia]. The impact of adverse weather on air operations…can be expected to affect: tactics, target and ordnance selection, maneuvering parameters, delivery accuracy, and vulnerability to enemy defenses. 44 The US was blessed with a six-month training period before engaging an exposed conventional adversary. 45 Despite these attributes and few situations with "troops in contact," the air campaign still required low-altitude CAS in poor weather conditions. 46 Weather over the deserts of Iraq was so bad that the air campaign was "absolutely beat down," to a point where it saw the "whole pace of the campaign disastrously affected." 47 USAF air-to-ground training has historically focused on the most effective use of airpower instead of the most common need for airpower. Air Force doctrine emphasizes the success of strategic attack efforts in the WWII Combined Bomber Offensive, Linebacker II, and Desert Storm, while minimizing counterland effects echoed from Chosin, Khe Sanh, and Khafji. 52 The
Tet offensive of 1968 and the Kosovo campaign of 1999 attest to potential conflict where a "halt" phase may not begin until enemy troops engage friendly ground forces or civilians.
The checkered history of preserving US counterland expertise between conflicts is described in USAF Counterland Doctrine. "While the end of World War II, the Korean War, and the war in Vietnam each saw AI and CAS procedures honed to a fine art, the period after each of those conflicts saw a marked decline due to other priorities." 53 In contrast to the repeated neglect of all weather CAS/AI skills, nuclear training always receives the highest priority. The US military possesses a robust nuclear capability in it's bomber, ICBM, and submarine forces. Nuclear training is at the heart of their mission but comes at a steep price for tactical aviators. Vietnam era F-100, F-105 and F-4 aviators lost valuable CAS/BAI training while preparing for nuclear operations. TAC manuals directed training programs to master tactical nuclear operations at the expense of conventional combat capability.
Nuclear training will in every instance take precedence over non-nuclear familiarization and qualification. It is emphasized that conventional training will not be accomplished at the expense of higher priority nuclear training required by this manual. Non-MSF [mobile strike force] units will restrict conventional familiarization to the accomplishment of only one event per aircrew per year. The late ground offensive in Desert Storm and the absence of friendly troops in Kosovo kept operating altitudes above the most lethal threat envelopes. 57 This trend may change in a world of unpredictable urban conflict and increased peace operations. Peace operations require "troops in contact" and air support in a dangerous environment. Despite the desire to remain above the reach of surface threats, history proves that when troops are placed in harm's way, aircraft are expected to take the fight to the enemy regardless of the threat situation. 58 In light of Desert Storm and Allied Force combat losses, training programs have failed to adequately address surface threat lethality. Increased peace operations and urban combat are only a few of the emerging trends that threaten CAF combat capability. If training programs fail to align to these trends, the survival of aviators and friendly troops will rest on forgotten skills from forgotten battles. The US experience in Somalia includes many trends of modern conflict. Mogadishu had swelled in population due to starving masses in the countryside while warlords wielded the real power in the city. 3 The urban battlefield restricted mobility as concerns for collateral damage and noncombatant casualties restricted firepower. 4 Fixed wing urban CAS was unavailable and the unconventional Somali air defenses inflicted moderate losses to Army helicopters. 5 "We faced urban warriors and found that their resilience in the face of massive casualties was greater than our political will as we suffered comparatively few." 6 The urban melee did not differ greatly from a World War I or II street battle or, for that matter, a primitive tribal conflict from 5000 years ago. It reaffirms the adage that: "technologies come and go, but the primitive endures." 7 Now imagine a city like Mogadishu with a SAM on its hospital.
Notes

Opstempo and Combat Capability
Our strength is based mainly on the pilot and not the weapon system…Top grade pilots will achieve magnificent results even with less superior aircraft, but the bad pilot in a good aircraft has no impact on the aircraft's performance.
-Israeli Air Force Training Manual
The dramatic increase in USAF contingency operations in the face of force reductions is well documented. The US Air Force is 40 percent smaller than it was during the Cold War, yet the rate at which it is employed has risen by a factor of four. Combat unit readiness has dropped well over 20 percent and the mission capability rates of aircraft are down by 10 percent over the last decade. Comparatively, during the 1980's, virtually all the time US military aircrew spent in the air was high-quality training time. These crews performed exceptionally well in Operation Desert Storm, and this performance was due to combat skills honed during the final years of the Cold War. The extensive commitment of USAF personnel to peace operations in the years since the Gulf War ended has come largely at the expense of high-quality training time. Consequently, relative to the forces that fought and won the Gulf War, today's Air Force is both smaller and on average, less proficient at basic combat tasks. One of the most far-reaching problems identified at both Fallon [Naval Air Station] and Nellis [Air Force Base] is the declining skill level of pilots in the operational force. While it was noted that Weapon School students were still strong on classroom knowledge, new students are less proficient in key skill areas. We are producing a combat pilot cohort that, while not second rate, compares poorly to what the Navy and Air Force have produced in the past.
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Continually high optempo also has an adverse affect on aviator retention. Many squadrons struggle with less than 50 percent of their aviators falling into the "experienced"
category. 12 An "experienced" tactical aviator is defined as having 500 hours of flight time in assigned aircraft. 13 A recent RAND study on the Air Force pilot shortage states that "declining experience levels in flying units confronts the Air Force with its most serious problem….serious enough to compromise the ability of fighter units to accomplish their primary missions and meet AEF demands" 14 The net result of a smaller force, higher optempo, lower aircraft mission capable rates, less experience and less flying is a significant reduction in CAF lethality. It is imperative that the available forces focus on locating and killing low-contrast targets in a surface threat environment. Until that occurs, effectively dispensing that lethality will remain an elusive science.
Minimizing Collateral Damage and Casualties
Just as high optempo degrades combat capability, increased restrictions to offensive firepower reduce lethality as well. Political restrictions can totally eliminate a once valid target from a targeting list. Public opinion and public support are increasingly centers of gravity (COG) for US operations with collateral damage and friendly casualties comprising two of the biggest factors affecting public opinion. 15 Collateral damage in war is as old as war itself. Real-time news coverage in the Gulf War introduced unprecedented levels of concern for collateral damage. The images of the demolished
Al Fidros bunker immediately curtailed attack sorties into Baghdad, effectively achieving what
Iraqi air defenses failed to accomplish during three weeks of air attacks. 16 Airmen faced similar pressure during Allied Force following inadvertent strikes on the Chinese embassy and Kosovar refugees.
Press coverage of American casualties also affects US combat capability. The graphic abuse of a fallen US soldier in Mogadishu accelerated America's departure from Somalia. 17 Two years later, the loss of an F-16 during Deny Flight resulted in Combat Air Patrols (CAP) being pulled back to the Adriatic for nearly two months. 18 Whether casualty avoidance and collateral damage minimization represent sound national policy or a hobbling obsession is immaterial. However, they have unquestionable effects on combat capability and must be included in realistic training.
SAM Proliferation
SAM proliferation is a growing threat to American aviators. US adversaries are acutely aware of US air-to-air dominance and limited SEAD capability. The limited success of Serbian air defenses and the inability of Iraq to defend against US aircraft make the newer SA-10/12 a top acquisition priority for many developing countries. The USAF reports that more than 14 countries already have weapons equivalent to the Russian-made SA-10 and SA-12, and estimates that 24 countries will have such weapons by 2005. 19 When compared to older SAMs, these newer missiles are faster, more maneuverable, and have larger engagement zones. They give off fewer electronic indications and warnings to SAM suppression and target aircraft, making them less susceptible to jamming and countermeasures. 20 These SAMs are capable of engaging six times as many targets as older systems. 21 SAMs that had been recently relocated engaged and brought down two aircraft during Allied Force. These new SAMs are very mobile specifically for this type of operation. One of the most challenging tactical scenarios is the presence of a SA-10/12 in an urban environment.
Urban Warfare
Urban conflicts are some of the most hazardous military operations. The US has traditionally bypassed cities during wartime operations. Yet urban warfare is rapidly becoming a predominant form of modern conflict.
The main reason that a large percentage of future conflict will take place in cities is the sheer demographics of a changing world. Estimates suggest that more than 85 percent of the world's population will live in urban areas by 2015. 22 Despite the costs and hazards of urban operations, they are already the norm for some US forces. The Marine Corps has been involved in urban operations in 237 of it's last 250 deployments. 23 The other reasons for an increase in urban warfare are US strengths and weaknesses.
American strengths lie in mobility, surface firepower, airpower and information dominance against conventional forces. Urban battlefields weaken each of these strengths while providing a guerilla force with optimal hit-and-run terrain. Just as the Serbs dispersed forces into the austere Kosovo countryside, potential enemies can easily disperse assets inside urban terrain.
"Adversaries often view casualty sensitivity as the United States' "center of gravity" and adopt their strategies accordingly." 24 Urban settings provide the highest probability for media to broadcast images of American or noncombatant casualties back to the US. Urban terrain restricts air and surface firepower due to concern for collateral damage. Urban environments also enable enemy forces to mix and mingle with noncombatants to force close combat. That is just one characteristic of the new "warrior-class" we face in the cities.
The Warrior Class
World demographics describe the environment of future conflict and the resource challenges for developing nations. A new warrior class grows from this struggle to control and terrorize the cities of the world. Ralph Peters in Fighting for the Future, describes this new warrior class:
We will often face men who have acquired a taste for killing, who do not behave rationally according to our definition of rationality, who are capable of atrocities that challenge the descriptive powers of language and who will sacrifice their own kind in order to survive. We will face opponents for whom treachery is routine, whose sole motivation to refrain from killing is the fear of being killed, for whom peace is the least rewarding human condition, and they will not be impressed by tepid shows of force with restrictive rules of engagement. When we drive the warriors into a corner or defeat them, they will agree to anything. When our attention is elsewhere, they will break the agreement. Their behavior, natural to them, is unthinkable to us. And then they massacre. 25 A guerilla warrior is not an insurmountable opponent alone or even en masse. He is however, the most incompatible adversary for US military structure, psyche and training. 26 Whether fighting in the cities or in the countryside, guerilla warriors will not mass their fielded forces. The warrior thrives and terrorizes in the city while CAF training and resources are structured to locate and kill conventional threats on the deserts, plains, and fields of the world. 27 Americans live and breathe respect for life and the law while the warrior often possesses neither of these values. 28 A warrior is normally prepared to absorb the hardship, collateral damage, and casualties from an attack better than the US system is prepared to deliver such an attack. 
Locating and Killing Low-Contrast Targets
History echoes the recurring lesson of low-contrast battlefield targets. Increased peace operations indicates increased situations with troops-in-contact and a continuing demand for CAS and interdiction skills. Few multi-role fighter units perform even a minimum amount of CAS training. 6 The CAS training which is performed seldom includes adverse weather or urban targets. CAS employment in either urban terrain or adverse weather requires increased levels of coordination. Accordingly, aviators must train in these environments to attain the required proficiency to safely execute CAS in adverse weather and terrain.
The center of gravity of a guerilla army is often the fielded and dispersed army itself. The Air Force's Find-Fix-Track-Target-Engage-Assess (F 2 T 2 EA) attack continuum against lowcontrast targets must obviously start with the "find" aspect. 7 This can only happen if the shooter is autonomously capable of finding the target or receives a sensor-to-shooter link to guide it to the "target" and "engage" phase.
US information and surveillance assets are essential for this support. Despite this requirement, units rarely, if ever, train with Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), or U-2 imagery. 8 Current unit training to find and kill low contrast targets is not congruent with prevailing needs and expectations.
Recommendation: Surface attack training must concentrate on killing low-contrast targets protected by mobile threats instead of exposed targets with fixed defenses. Training in coordination with information, surveillance and reconnaissance platforms provides needed CAS/interdiction skills. Increased CAS skills are required from every multi-role fighter including skills required in an urban environment. This flexibility and coordination will also serve to improve strategic attack skills. Squadron training should utilize available Marine Corps and Army urban ranges as units participate in urban warfare exercises.
Paying the Bill
Nothing is free in business including the business of killing. Therefore, training sorties for threat defense, increased blue air-to-air, and urban CAS must come from existing operations and maintenance (O&M) accounts. Joint or ANG aggressors can absorb a high percentage of red air sorties for the upcoming F-22 OT&E, Weapons School syllabus, Red Flag and AEF training.
This provides enough blue air training to increase air-to-air readiness and start a threat defense training program. Reducing sorties dedicated to strategic attack will enable adequate sorties for threat defense and CAS without adversely affecting strategic attack capability. The return on this investment is a more lethal and a more survivable force.
Conclusion
Past lessons and current trends that affect combat capability are undeniable. Adapting daily training to these lessons and trends will help aviators survive the greatest threats and kill the toughest targets. Dedicated surface threat training and dedicated adversaries will ensure that new technology SAMs and MiGs will be unable to inflict unacceptable losses. Training to engage low-contrast battlefield and urban targets will prepare Air Force fighters for the greatest recurring and upcoming airpower challenge. Minimal realignments to the CAF training regimen will pay for the implementation of this training program. The Air Force cannot allow the ineptitude of recent adversaries to provide the US with an air of general superiority and it cannot wait for a catastrophic military failure to provide the catalyst towards innovation. 
